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I.	Introduction	
	
The	institution	of	finance	exists	in	principle	to	facilitate	access	to	capital	such	
that	people	or	firms	may	ultimately	realize	their	individual	ambitions,	and	society,	
in	aggregate,	can	benefit	from	the	realization	of	these	ambitions.	More	precisely,	as	
John	Boatright	illuminates	in	his	book	Finance	Ethics:	
“finance	may	be	defined	broadly	as	the	generation,	allocation,	exchange	and	
management	of	monetary	resources…[The	activities	of	finance]	are	
facilitated	or	mediated	by	a	variety	of	financial	markets	and	financial	
institutions,	such	as	securities	and	commodities	exchanges,	commercial	and	
investment	banks,	insurance	companies,	mutual	and	pension	funds,	and	the	
like.	In	addition,	finance	includes	the	academic	subject	called	finance	that	is	
studied	in	business	schools	and	constitutes	the	training	that	people	in	
finance	–	both	scholars	and	practitioners	–	receive.”1	
	
Over	time,	individuals	have	used	tools	of	finance	to	increase	their	own	personal	and	
familial	holdings,	to	seek	education,	and	to	begin	gaining	equity	stakes	in	their	own	
homes,	among	other	pursuits.	Corporations	have	used	finance	to	capitalize	new	
business	ventures,	to	provide	funds	for	investment	in	research	and	development,	
and	to	expand	into	new	markets.	Finance,	through	its	various	instruments	and	
practices,	has	thus	enabled	people	to	make	manifest	their	ambitions	and	has	
allowed	creative	ideas	to	flourish	in	competitive	markets.	Finance,	in	essence,	serves	
as	the	organizing	principle	that	provides	for	vigorous	economic	activity	and	wealth	
generation	in	societies	where	it	functions	properly	and,	as	such,	“it	can	be	used	to	
help	broaden	prosperity	across	an	increasingly	wide	range	of	social	classes.”2	Given	
this	capacity	to	broaden	prosperity	for	all,	finance	should	be	used	as	a	tool	of	wealth	
democratization	if	it	is	to	stay	true	to	its	terms	of	original	instantiation.	
																																																								
1	Boatright	3	
2	Shiller	9	
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Four	principal	human	values	that	motivate	institutional	finance	are	self‐
determination,	efficient	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐term	growth.	Self‐
determination	allows	individuals	to	explore	their	passions,	develop	their	talents,	
and	construct	individual	lives	that	they	deem	worthy	of	pursuit.	Efficient	allocation	
ensures	that	scarce	assets	are	utilized	as	resourcefully	as	possible,	ultimately	in	
service	of	the	greatest	number	of	people	at	a	minimal	cost	to	society.	Fairness,	a	
fundamental	human	impulse,	as	translated	through	the	market,	confers	to	each	
individual	or	corporation	a	payoff	that	suitably	compensates	the	scale	of	his	or	her	
contribution.3	Long‐term	growth	guarantees	that	investments	that	we	make	today,	
whether	in	the	individual,	in	corporations,	or	in	capital	funds,	will	help	us	flourish	
sustainably	in	the	future.	Finance,	a	manmade	tool	developed	to	satisfy	these	human	
pursuits,	should	be	consistently	oriented	towards	their	realization.	Products,	such	
as	investment	vehicles	or	loan	policies,	should	be	engineered	to	give	users	greater	
self‐determination,	provided	that	these	users	themselves	abide	by	proper	rules	of	
play.	Financial	markets,	in	which	countless	actors	conduct	scalable	transactions	
each	and	every	day,	should	intrinsically	seek	long‐term	growth	by	distributing	
resources	competitively	and	fairly.	In	order	for	market	actors	to	reap	the	future	
benefits	of	today’s	financial	transactions,	these	markets	must	rightfully	capitalize	
those	endeavors	that	will	constitute	our	tomorrow.	A	financial	setup	that	prioritizes	
the	principles	of	self‐determination,	allocative	efficiency,	fairness,	and	long‐term	
growth	perspective	aligns	with	a	well‐understood	concept	of	finance.	Finance	has	a	
																																																								
3	Boatright	167	
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social	responsibility	to	pursue	these	human	goals	so	that	it	can	generate	and	
distribute	substantial	wealth.	
While	society	at	large	would	prosper	from	the	proper	conceptual	functioning	
of	financial	markets,	opportunities	do	arise	that	allow	smaller	entities,	either	
individuals,	corporations,	or	financial	institutions,	to	deviate	from	their	social	
responsibilities	in	pursuit	of	short‐term	profit.	These	actors’	deviations,	
compounded	over	time,	have	managed	to	undermine	the	initial	principles	of	self‐
determination,	efficient	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐term	growth	that	underlie	
finance.	Deviations	arise	from	the	fact	that	financial	institutions	themselves,	the	
“gatekeepers”	of	monetary	resources,	have	been	improperly	constructed	with	
incentive	structures	premised	around	short‐term	profit	generation.	Managers	of	
corporations	large	and	small,	for	example,	are	currently	evaluated	on	a	myopic	
basis,	with	CEO	compensation	determined	by	quarterly	or	annual	production	figures	
rather	than	on	their	ability	to	create	long‐term	value.	As	a	result,	companies	guided	
by	these	improperly	incentivized	managers	seek	daily	returns	at	the	expense	of	the	
companies’	future	growth.	In	this	context	of	misdirected	financial	institutions,	the	
ultimate	goals	of	finance,	self‐determination,	efficient	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐
term	growth,	are	obfuscated	at	a	great	cost	to	society.	
The	misdirection	of	modern	financial	structures	and	incentives	has	manifest	
social	consequences.	Self‐determination	in	this	context	for	the	individual	is	granted	
only	insofar	as	an	investment	in	the	individual	will	generate	immediate	kickbacks	
for	lending	institutions.	Efficient	allocation	cannot	properly	locate	the	companies	
that	will	constitute	our	tomorrow	because	these	companies’	investments	in	
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research	and	development	or	human	capital,	so	critical	for	their	steady	growth	in	a	
competitive	economic	environment,	are	not	reflected	as	quarterly	returns	on	a	
balance	sheet.	Fairness	becomes	an	impossible	dream,	as	the	gatekeepers	of	capital	
amass	wealth	through	their	positions	of	power	and	the	lower	portion	of	the	
socioeconomic	spectrum	grows	at	a	much	slower	pace.	This	wealth	inequality	then	
only	compounds	over	time,	drawing	finance	farther	and	farther	away	from	its	
conceptual	premise.	Perhaps	most	blatantly	brushed	aside	by	this	flawed	
institutional	setup	is	the	pursuit	of	long‐term	growth.	Operating	on	such	a	myopic	
basis,	many	firms	and	companies	become	naively	willing	to	dismiss	those	policies	
that	have	proven	to	generate	value	over	a	longer	time	horizon,	such	as	strong	
corporate	social	responsibility	platforms,	in	favor	of	practices	that	simply	inflate	
daily	share	prices.	The	deviations	of	actors,	corporations,	and	firms,	however,	are	
not	inevitable	and	can	be	addressed	to	align	finance	more	intimately	with	its	
fundamental	goals.	Irresponsibility	of	financial	institutions	can	be	corrected	from	
within	by	revised	incentive	structures	and	altered	accountability	practices	within	
firm	hierarchies.	It	can	be	further	addressed	externally	by	limited	but	directed	
political	regulation	that	preserves	the	competitive	market	nature	of	the	financial	
industry	while	impelling	each	individual	firm	to	accept	an	obligatory	social	
responsibility.	Such	high	level	corrections	could	begin	to	clarify	the	philosophy	that	
guides	financial	institutions,	pointing	them	towards	long‐term	value	creation	rather	
than	short‐term	rent	seeking.	By	addressing	those	institutional	policies	that	compel	
financiers	and	financial	institutions	to	act	in	ways	counter	to	the	goals	of	finance,	we	
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can	thus	begin	to	synchronize	the	conceptual	ideals	of	finance	with	its	day‐to‐day	
practice.	
II.	Understanding	the	Scope,	Intent,	and	Responsibilities	of	Finance	
	
1.	Conceptual	Finance	
	
Conceptually,	finance	consists	of	the	institutions,	mechanisms,	practices,	and	
individual	and	collective	actors	operating	to	protect,	direct,	and	allocate	society’s	
assets.	These	institutions	and	actors	ideally	will	seek	to	channel	resources	to	
growth‐oriented	prospects	or,	alternatively,	will	allocate	capital	that	produces	some	
present	benefit	for	one	individual	or	entity	while	generating	a	future	return	on	the	
present	investment	for	another	entity.	Products	and	practices	of	finance,	such	as	the	
home	mortgage	or	a	company’s	initial	public	offering,	will	thus	contribute	to	the	
growth	of	society’s	assets	over	time,	while	channeling	money	and	capital	into	those	
areas	of	development	with	the	highest	expectation	of	future	success	and	investment	
payoff.	Robert	Shiller,	in	his	book	Finance	and	the	Good	Society,	explains	that	as	a	
prerequisite	to	financial	contracting,	
“all	parties	to	an	agreement	have	to	want	to	embrace	the	goal,	do	the	work,	
and	accept	the	risks;	they	also	have	to	believe	that	others	involved	in	the	deal	
will	actually	work	productively	toward	the	common	goal	and	do	all	the	
things	that	the	best	information	suggests	should	be	done.	Finance	provides	
the	incentive	structure	necessary	to	tailor	these	activities	and	secure	these	
goals.”4	
	
This	characterization	of	finance	embeds	critical	assumptions	about	parties	who	seek	
to	engage	in	financial	contracts	in	a	social	context	and,	in	doing	so,	presupposes	
certain	social	behaviors	and	outcomes	that	result	from	the	successful	functioning	of	
financial	institutions.	Individuals	in	society	can	use	finance	as	an	outlet	of	self‐
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determination,	provided	they	feel	reasonably	assured	that	those	financiers	with	
whom	they	contract	have	their	best	interest,	and	personal	success,	as	a	mutual	end	
goal.	Firms	looking	to	grow	their	market	share	can	use	the	tools	of	finance	and	the	
expertise	of	financiers	to	efficiently	underwrite	their	enterprises,	giving	them	
expectations	of	optimized	returns	which	they	can	then	use	to	further	innovate	in	a	
vibrant	economy.	Additionally,	finance	can	serve	as	a	mechanism	of	market	fairness.	
It	can	provide	non‐discriminatory	capital	to	individuals	and	corporations	across	the	
socioeconomic	spectrum	while	still	maintaining	an	economic	structure	propelled	by	
competition.	Finance,	under	Shiller’s	definition,	is	able	to	synchronize	the	goals	of	
multiple	social	parties	into	a	mutually	beneficial	agreement,	producing	gains	for	
both	parties	involved	should	they	fulfill	proprietary	contractual	expectations	and	
obligations.	These	mutual	gains,	over	a	long‐term	time	horizon,	should	thus	usher	in	
expectations	of	economic	growth	and,	if	properly	managed,	wealth	democratization.	
More	latent	in	Shiller’s	characterization	of	finance	as	the	economic	backbone	
of	social	contracting	are	the	consequences	of	deviant	behavior	by	one	or	both	of	the	
parties	to	a	financial	contract.	As	Shiller	points	out,	finance	is	an	institution	
structured	by	incentives,	which	can	produce	absolute	gains	if	incentives	are	
balanced	properly.	However,	should	either	party	to	a	financial	contract	deviate	from	
its	obligations	in	pursuit	of	short	term	profit,	this	incentive	structure	is	thrown	off	
balance	at	the	expense	of	the	financial	arrangement’s	long	term	success.	Empirically,	
this	can	translate	into	the	misallocation	of	otherwise	growth‐oriented	capital	into	
the	hands	of	a	less	deserving	party,	which	result	detracts	from	long‐term	economic	
development.	This	deviant	behavior,	which	so	saliently	depicts	the	face	of	modern	
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finance,	stands	in	opposition	to	a	conceptual	definition	of	the	institution	and	will	be	
explored	here	in	greater	depth.	
1a.	Self‐Determination	
	
On	an	individual	basis,	the	tools	of	finance	should	allow	people	in	society	to	
access	liquidity,	manage	their	personal	and	familial	wealth,	and	allocate	their	
resources	towards	those	actions	and	assets	that	they	believe	will	enhance	their	own	
quality	of	life.	Such	tools	historically	have	included	mortgage	loans,	student	loans,	
trust	funds,	and	individual	retirement	accounts,	among	others.	These	tools	are	
ideally	intended	to	give	individuals	in	society	the	opportunity	to	lead	higher	quality	
lives	pursuing	activities	and	causes	that	they	believe	to	be	meaningful	or	
pleasurable.	It	has	become	clear	over	time	that	in	order	to	organize	social	behavior	
in	market	environments,	align	individuals’	shared	personal	and	social	goals,	and	
make	resources	consistently	available	for	the	individual	achievement	of	these	goals,	
it	is	necessary	for	sophisticated	financial	institutions	to	exist.	
Financial	institutions	were	indeed	borne	of	the	necessity	of	individuals	to	
obtain	access	to	capital	to	satisfy	personal	desires	and	ambitions.	Since	their	first	
primitive	manifestations	as	small‐scale	collateralized	lenders	in	ancient	Greece	and	
Rome,	financial	institutions	have	been	in	the	business	of	facilitating	gains	from	trade	
on	an	individual	level.	As	Shiller	makes	apparent	in	his	chapter	Categorizing	People:	
Financiers	versus	Artists	and	Other	Idealists,	finance	is	a	necessary	component	of	any	
and	all	social	endeavors	involving	contracting	individuals,	irrespective	of	the	field	or	
industry	within	which	they	are	contracting.	Using	the	example	of	“two	of	the	world’s	
most	highly	regarded	–	and	highly	priced	–	contemporary	artists,	Jeff	Koons	and	
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Damian	Hirst,”	Shiller	explains	that	both	artists	“…are	not	just	solitary	artists;	they	
are	both	financial	sophisticates.	Both	run	businesses	with	numerous	employees,	and	
both	are	aggressive	marketers	of	their	own	works.”5	In	order	to	successfully	pursue	
certain	passions,	as	Shiller	notes,	it	is	necessary	to	recognize	the	instrumentality	of	
financial	markets	in	bringing	idiosyncratic	endeavors	to	scale.	To	further	the	
example	of	successful	artists,	while	the	artists	themselves	contribute	the	central	
creative	and	thoughtful	dimensions	of	their	works,	finance	supplements	the	
production	process	by	locating	investors	in	these	works,	providing	the	funding	
necessary	to	complete	the	works,	and	organizing	markets	to	keep	the	art	trade	
functioning	efficiently	and	lucratively.	Although	these	considerations	often	lie	in	the	
background,	they	are	no	less	imperative	for	the	scalability	and	sustainability	of	
world	art	markets.	Extrapolated	to	individuals	working	in	diverse	trades	throughout	
the	world,	or	pursuing	a	range	of	dreams,	from	home‐ownership	to	higher	
education,	finance	consistently	plays	a	role	in	bringing	individual	pursuits	to	
fruition.	As	a	means	to	each	individual’s	pursuit	of	that	which	they	believe	
constitutes	a	life	worth	living,	then,	finance	has	both	great	power	and	great	
responsibility.	
1b.	Efficient	Allocation	
	
On	a	broader	corporate	basis,	the	tools	of	finance	should	be	used	to	allocate	
capital	provisionally	to	those	companies	whose	ideas,	business	models,	and	use	of	
capital	suggest	successful	future	growth	and	proliferation.	Whether	this	success	is	
measured	through	metrics	such	as	return	on	investment,	corporate	longevity	and	
																																																								
5	Shiller	136	
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sustainability,	or	employment	opportunities	that	a	company	could	present	to	its	
hosting	community,	those	businesses	that	receive	capital	injections	should	possess	
fundamental	and	intrinsic	value	that	will	utilize	granted	capital	most	effectively.	
Over	time,	as	business	needs	evolve	and	demands	change,	financial	products	suited	
towards	capitalizing	these	needs	should,	in	a	well‐developed	financial	market	with	
proper	accountability	standards	in	place,	be	able	to	respond	with	apt	flexibility	and	
minimal	risk.	Structured	products	of	various	sorts,	predominantly	debt	and	equity	
lending,	can	then	allow	growing,	mature,	or	even	struggling	businesses	to	finance	
their	set‐up,	operational,	and	expansionary	needs.	Conceptually,	the	results	of	these	
corporate	financing	activities	come	in	the	form	of	increased	employment,	enterprise	
profitability,	continual	business	innovation	and	healthy	market	competition,	among	
others.6		
Financial	institutions	such	as	banks,	pension	funds,	private	equity	shops,	
asset	management	firms,	and	community	lenders,	among	others,	each	has	an	
obligation	to	allocate	capital	efficiently	if	they	hope	to	serve	their	specific	social	
function.	These	institutions,	according	to	Shiller’s	characterization	of	finance,	
represent	the	“stewards”	of	society’s	assets,	helping	to	match	investors	with	
creative	investment	opportunities,	moving	large	pools	of	capital	into	long‐term	
growth	projects	or	investment	funds,	and	providing	the	capital	and	advisory	
services	needed	to	bring	aspiring	business	ventures	to	scale.	The	profits	that	these	
institutions	generate	from	their	business	activities,	ideally,	will	represent	a	fraction	
of	the	growth	that	they	help	to	create	in	the	broader	economy	as	a	result	of	their	
																																																								
6	Rajan	and	Zingales	108	
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operations.7	Provided	these	institutions	follow	proper	corporate	governance	
procedures,	financial	institutions’	profits	should	be	contingent	on	broader	social	
prosperity,	riding	the	same	waves	of	economic	growth	and	stagnancy	as	the	rest	of	
society	does	(although	the	correspondence	of	these	two	outcomes	was	most	
recently	called	into	questiong	during	the	2007	crisis	in	which	global	economic	
markets	violently	contracted	while	financial	institutions’	profits	remained	steadily	
on	the	rise).	Even	those	who	subscribe	to	the	profit‐driven	shareholder	theory	of	the	
firm	admit	that	there	is	social	wealth	to	be	generated	through	this	form	of	
cooperative	capital	allocation.	As	Boatright	reiterates	in	his	chapter	Ethical	
Implications	of	Finance,	“the	goal	of	capital	budgeting	is	to	find	and	invest	in	projects	
that	increase	the	value	of	the	firm	in	general	and,	more	specifically,	increase	
shareholder	wealth,	or	equivalently,	the	price	of	the	firm’s	shares…However,	it	
should	be	emphasized	that	firms	that	undertake	profitable	investment	projects	
contribute	to	the	wealth	of	society	and	this	is	a	major	contribution	of	business	to	
societal	well‐being.”8	Even	in	the	competitive	context	of	shareholder	theory,	finance	
is	expected	to	raise	the	overall	level	of	social	wealth	while	efficiently	allocating	
capital	according	to	market	demand.	In	moving	capital	where	it	can	be	most	
																																																								
7	Rajan	and	Zingales	help	to	establish	this	fundamental	relationship	between	
developed	financial	markets	and	economic	growth,	concluding	from	multiple	
studies	that	“…few	would	now	doubt	that	there	exists	a	causal	link	between	the	
development	of	the	financial	sector	and	the	growth	of	the	economy…Finance	cannot	
create	opportunities,	but	it	makes	it	easier	to	exploit	them:	what	it	can	do	is	identify	
the	areas	of	opportunity	and	decline,	and	achieve	a	better	match	by	giving	to	sectors	
with	a	future	while	taking	away	from	those	with	only	a	past.”	(Rajan	and	Zingales	
113)	
8	Boatright	32	
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productive,	finance	properly	guided	can	help	to	foster	innovation	in	business,	create	
jobs,	and	raise	the	socioeconomic	bottom	line.	
1c.	Fairness	
In	addition	to	being	vehicles	of	self‐determination	and	efficient	allocation,	
financial	markets	also	have	a	responsibility	to	be	fair	distributors	of	capital	over	
time.	In	order	to	be	fair,	markets	should	be	open	and	equally	accessible	to	each	
member	of	society	so	that	any	individual	or	corporation,	regardless	of	initial	
position	or	context	of	origin,	has	equal	opportunity	to	take	advantage	of	the	benefits	
of	financial	markets.	As	financial	markets	develop	over	time,	they	have	a	tendency	to	
perpetually	allow	wealth	to	accrue	to	a	class	of	elite	citizens,	a	consequences	that	
has	the	effect	of	unfairly	restricting	a	wide	swath	of	society	from	accessing	finance’s	
intrinsic	benefits.	As	Rajan	and	Zingales	recognize	in	their	book	Saving	Capitalism	
from	the	Capitalists,	the	economically	powerful	in	developed	financial	markets	have	
incentive,	and	the	necessary	power,	to	keep	markets	working	in	their	favor	so	that	
they	may	reap	disproportionate	economic	and	financial	benefits	at	the	expense	of	
others	in	society.	In	direct	conflict	with	this	pattern	of	accrued	advantages,	the	
principle	of	fairness	in	the	context	of	financial	markets	requires	that	“we	should	
honor	claims	in	proportion	to	their	strength…we	can	assert	that	fairness	at	both	a	
substantive	and	procedural	level	involves…the	proportional	satisfaction	of	claims	
existing	prior	to	the	making	of	rules,	agreements,	or	expectations.”9	This	definition	
makes	clear	that	pre‐existing	advantages,	which	can	come	in	the	form	of	inherited	
assets,	greater	access	to	educational	opportunities,	or	even	broader	exposure	to	
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potentially	lucrative	career	paths,	should	have	no	bearing	on	the	probability	that	an	
individual	or	a	firm	can	achieve	personal	or	corporate	“success”	in	society.10	While	
this	definition	does	not	imply	that	income	inequality	per	se	is	harmful,	it	does	imply	
that	economic	inequalities	should	be	consistently	checked	so	as	to	not	create	a	
generational	legacy	of	increasing	social	stratification.	To	this	end,	financial	markets	
can	regulate	themselves	to	satisfy	the	criterion	of	fairness.	Rajan	and	Zingales	agree	
that,	“given	the	right	infrastructure…financiers	can	overcome	the	tyranny	of	
collateral	and	connections	and	make	credit	available	even	to	the	poor.	They	become	
a	power	for	the	good	rather	than	the	guardians	of	the	status	quo.”11	Such	
parameters	of	fairness,	wherein	individuals	are	encouraged	to	pursue	their	creative	
ambitions	and	can	hope	to	be	rewarded	(or	punished)	adequately,	will	ultimately	
contribute	to	a	vibrant	economic	and	social	structure	undergirded	by	sustainable	
financial	foundations.	
Fairness	as	a	distributive	principle	is	often	depicted	as	mutually	exclusive	
with	the	concepts	of	efficiency	and	profit	maximization	and	thus	can	obscure	the	
theoretical	aims	of	financial	institutions.	As	Eugene	Heath	describes,	however,	in	his	
chapter	Fairness	in	Financial	Markets	regarding	the	responsibility	of	financial	
institutions	with	respect	to	fairness:	
“an	appeal	to	efficiency	provides	a	valuable	reminder	that	the	legal	and	
regulatory	framework	of	bank	lending	should	provide	the	conditions	for	
productivity.	However,	the	value	of	this	sort	of	analysis	does	not	vitiate	the	
importance	of	moral	considerations	such	as	those	of	fairness.	A	normative	or	
moral	evaluation	of	businesses	and	markets	examines	commercial	practices	
in	terms	of	their	foundational	principles	or	in	terms	of	the	operations	and	
interactions	that	arise	once	these	principles	are	set	in	place.	The	concept	of	
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fairness,	for	example,	may	be	invoked	to	consider	the	foundational	
framework	of	markets	as	well	as	the	rules	and	regulations	of	ongoing	
exchanges…”12	
	
According	to	Heath,	although	fairness	is	not	a	necessary	component	of	properly	
structured	financial	market,	it	may	be	used	as	an	important	criterion	against	which	
to	judge	the	morality	of	markets.	Insofar	as	we	should	strive	for	markets	to	espouse	
a	principle	of	morality,	they	should	thus	be	continually	judged	by	a	strict	standard	of	
fairness.	If	financial	markets	are	disproportionately	conferring	profits	to	the	
wealthy,	through	executive	compensation	schemes	or	discriminatory	credit	
extensions	as	a	result	of	preconceived	expectations,	then	broadening	social	
stratification	will	consistently	result	as	a	byproduct	of	these	markets.	Wealth	
inequalities	will	compound	and	exacerbate	to	the	point	of	market	collapse.	Should	
fairness	become	a	priority	of	financial	market	actors	and	institutions,	wealth	could	
be	created	on	a	broader	scale,	conferring	the	benefits	of	financial	institutions	to	the	
many	rather	than	to	a	select	few.	
1d.	Long‐Termism	
	
Perhaps	the	most	fundamental	normative	principle	underlying	personal,	
corporate,	and	public	finance	is	the	pursuit	of	long‐term	growth.	Individuals	looking	
to	accumulate	resources	to	pass	on	through	their	families,	corporations	seeking	
sustainability,	and	governments	looking	to	mitigate	future	resource	risk	all	can	rely	
on	tools	of	finance	to	enhance	their	long‐term	prospects	for	success.	Unfortunately,	
short‐term	profit	maximization	generally	precludes	long‐term	value	creation,	
though	short‐termism	has	seemingly	become	the	status	quo	for	rational	activity	in	
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financial	markets.	As	Michael	Jensen	of	the	Harvard	Business	School	argues	in	his	
paper	Value	Maximization,	Stakeholder	Theory,	and	the	Corporate	Objective	Function,	
“short‐term	profit	maximization	at	the	expense	of	long‐term	value	creation	is	a	sure	
way	to	destroy	value…[the	implications	of	this	are]	that	we	must	give	employees	
and	managers	a	structure	that	will	help	them	resist	the	temptation	to	maximize	
short‐term	financial	performance	(as	typically	measured	by	accounting	profits	or,	
even	worse,	earnings	per	share).”13	Value,	according	to	Jensen,	may	be	captured	
most	efficiently	through	strategies	of	long‐termism:	investing	in	a	strong	corporate	
social	responsibility	platform,	funding	research	and	development,	and	integrating	
intangibles	such	as	customer	satisfaction	or	employee	welfare	into	financial	metrics.	
With	the	proper	distributive	mechanisms	in	place,	this	wealth	can	help	serve	the	
purposes	of	self‐determination,	efficient	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐termism	that	
also	underlie	normative	finance.	
1e.	Meeting	Finance’s	Goals	in	a	Competitive	Market	Economy	
	
	 Though	finance,	by	design,	should	honor	the	ideals	of	self‐determination,	
efficient	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐termism,	financial	firms’	pursuit	of	these	
values	often	seems	to	erode	their	individual	competitiveness.	Can	we	design	a	
competitive	system	in	which	institutions	can	realistically	translate	an	individuals’	
right	of	self‐determination	into	a	long‐term	profit	maximizing	business	objective?	
Are	resources	not	allocated	properly	to	produce	the	highest	possible	return	on	
investment	if	a	firm	decides	to	donate	to	a	community	non‐profit	rather	than	placing	
its	capital	into	a	promising	new	business	venture?	As	Forest	Reinhardt	and	Robert	
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Stavins	of	the	Harvard	Business	School	and	the	John	F.	Kennedy	School	of	
Government	at	Harvard	University	respectively	note,	firms’	commitments	to	their	
social	obligations	do	not	necessarily	beget	substantial	profits	in	an	imperfectly	
competitive	economic	landscape:	“in	the	real	world	of	asymmetric	information	and	
oligopoly,	the	evolutionary	mechanisms	that	might	be	thought	to	preclude	firms	
from	engaging	in	profit‐sacrificing	behaviour	are	not	always	effective.	If	their	
managers	want	to	sacrifice	profits	to	promote	what	they	see	as	the	public	interest,	
they	may	be	able	to	do	so	as	long	as	one	or	more	of	their	input	or	output	markets	is	
imperfectly	competitive.”14	Accordingly,	firms	can	expect	to	generate	reasonable	
profits	while	still	prioritizing	social	obligations	such	as	individual	self‐
determination	and	fairness.	The	profits	may	reflect	the	value	that	customers	ascribe	
to	a	firm’s	commitment	to	its	core	social	responsibilities.15	Or,	through	providing	
individuals	with	fair	mortgage	loans	or	flexible	student	loan	policies,	firms	can	
command	customer	loyalty	and	incentivize	reciprocity	to	build	their	customer	base	
and	lower	loan	default	rates,	both	profit‐enhancing	strategies.	Similarly,	although	a	
donation	to	a	local	non‐profit	might	seem	to	cut	directly	into	a	firm’s	bottom	line,	
the	reputational	kickback	may	have	the	effect	of	improving	the	firm’s	overall	
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perception	and	future	profits.16	Though	pursuit	of	social	obligations	might	not	
necessarily	be	consistent	with	a	financial	firm’s	competitiveness	in	an	efficient	
market	setting,	the	efficient	markets	hypothesis’	failure	to	adequately	capture	the	
value	of	intangibles	implies	that	the	two	pursuits,	competitiveness	and	fulfillment	of	
certain	key	social	obligations,	may	not	be	so	mutually	exclusive	after	all.	
	 State	policy	is	needed	to	supplement	a	firm’s	independent	incentives	to	fulfill	
its	social	obligations.	The	competitive	advantages	a	firm	can	accrue	by	prioritizing	
intangibles	such	as	individual	self‐determination	and	fairness	must	level	off	at	a	
certain	point,	at	which	juncture	firms	will	begin	to	see	a	tradeoff	between	short‐
term	profit	maximization	and	long‐term	value	creation.	It	is	precisely	at	this	point	
where	governments	must	regulate	the	actions	of	financial	firms	so	that	they	can	
continue	to	be	competitive	and	profitable	without	forgoing	their	social	
responsibilities.	As	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	reiterated	following	the	Great	Depression,	
a	time	in	which	the	competitive	forces	of	financiers	and	financial	markets	seemed	to	
override	our	most	basic	social	considerations,	“men	may	differ	as	to	the	particular	
form	of	governmental	activity	with	respect	to	industry	and	business,	but	nearly	all	
are	agreed	that	private	enterprise	in	times	such	as	these	cannot	be	left	without	
assistance	and	without	and	without	reasonable	safeguards	lest	it	destroy	not	only	
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itself	but	also	our	processes	of	civilization.”17	Roosevelt	continued	by	remarking	that	
the	corrosive	short‐term	competitive	practices	of	the	banking	industry,	“…in	the	sale	
of	securities,	in	the	deliberate	encouragement	of	stock	gambling,	in	the	sale	of	
unsound	mortgages”	could	be	addressed	by	restrictions	on	trading	practices	or	new	
legislation	such	as	the	Securities	Exchange	Act.18	This	regulation,	far	from	detracting	
from	individual	firm	competitiveness,	applied	even‐handed	rules	to	the	conduct	of	
each	firm	within	financial	markets	that	guided	them	towards	their	greater	social	
obligations.	By	increasing	transparency	in	the	securities	markets,	limiting	trading	
arbitrage	opportunities,	and	creating	greater	oversight	of	mortgage	markets,	state	
regulation	during	the	New	Deal	helped	usher	finance	in	the	direction	of	greater	self‐
determination,	efficient	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐termism.	Though	these	
regulations	have	been	challenged	by	new	competitive	strategies	arising	in	modern	
markets,	upkeep	of	this	state	infrastructure	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	markets	and	
their	component	firms	remain	in	the	service	of	their	fundamental	social	goals.	
1f.	Summary	
	 The	pursuit	of	better	ways	to	achieve	simple	human	goals	has	always	driven	
finance	forward.	Finance	can	serve	as	an	instrument	of	self‐determination	by	
providing	individuals	with	resources	to	access	higher	education	or	mortgages	with	
which	to	purchase	their	own	homes.	Finance	can	serve	as	an	instrument	of	efficient	
allocation	by	placing	capital	with	the	best	and	brightest	ideas,	those	that	will	shape	
our	world	tomorrow.	Finance	can	serve	as	an	instrument	of	fairness	if	it	is	
adequately	socially	democratized,	maintaining	a	competitive	economic	landscape	
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while	giving	each	individual	or	business	an	equal	opportunity	to	realize	success.	
Finally,	finance	can	embed	long‐term	growth	into	the	process	of	economic	
development,	acting	as	an	agent	of	value	creation	rather	than	a	short‐term	profit	
machine.	Robert	Shiller	poignantly	states,	“the	goals	served	by	finance	originate	
within	us.	They	reflect	our	interests	in	careers,	hopes	for	our	families,	ambitions	for	
our	businesses,	aspirations	for	our	culture,	and	ideals	for	our	society…The	better	
aligned	a	society’s	financial	institutions	are	with	its	goals	and	ideals,	the	stronger	
and	more	successful	the	society	will	be.”19	To	the	extent	that	society	should	strive	to	
be	an	agent	of	individual	and	collective	prosperity,	and	should	foster	creativity	and	
dynamism	through	its	economic	markets,	financial	institutions	should	share	these	
goals.	Though	characterizations	of	finance	today	largely	focus	on	the	shortcomings	
of	financial	mechanics	that	arise	largely	as	a	result	of	market	competition,	we	must	
not	lose	sight	of	the	wealth	that	finance	has	the	potential	to	generate.	Beyond	
monetary	value,	finance	can	allow	individuals	to	explore	their	passions,	can	propel	
innovative	business	ventures	forward,	can	raise	the	socioeconomic	bottom	line,	and	
can	achieve	these	goals	sustainably.	Under	these	conditions,	finance	can	work	for	
the	masses,	democratizing	wealth	and	promoting	the	values	of	a	truly	“good	
society.”	
II.	How	Finance	Has	Fallen	Short	
The	modern	portrayal	of	finance	as	principally	beneficial	to	those	working	
within	the	boundaries	of	the	financial	industry	stands	in	direct	opposition	to	
Shiller’s	characterization	of	finance	as	the	science	behind	the	achievement	of	
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mutually	beneficial	social	goals.	Nonetheless,	specific	and	proven	deviations	from	
the	conceptual	ambitions	of	finance	by	actors	in	the	financial	space	do	make	this	
characterization	tenable.	Often	deviations	from	the	conceptual	ideal	are	a	result	of	
competitive	market	forces	rewarding	firms	and	financiers	who	can	maximize	short‐
term	profits	rather	than	create	longer‐term	value.	As	Rajan	and	Zingales	remark,	the	
financial	industry,	by	its	very	nature,	could	perversely	become	a	means	to	
preserving	the	social	status	quo	for	those	at	the	top	of	the	economic	pyramid	
through	misuse	of	industry	resources.	Accordingly,	they	note	that	the	sophistication	
of	the	financial	industry	causes	it	to	attract	workers	who	have	had	the	ability,	time,	
and	resources	to	become	well	versed	in	its	subtleties.	These	workers	generally	
already	constitute	an	economically	powerful	class	upon	entry	into	the	financial	
industry,	and	as	such,	seek	to	control	markets	and	orient	them	in	their	favor,	
although	collectively	this	may	entail	forsaking	the	conceptual	ambitions	of	finance.	
They	claim,	“the	economically	powerful	are	concerned	about	institutions	
underpinning	free	markets	because	they	treat	people	equally,	making	power	
redundant.	The	markets	themselves	add	insult	to	injury.	They	are	a	source	of	
competition,	forcing	the	powerful	to	prove	their	competence	again	and	again.	Since	
a	person	may	be	powerful	because	of	his	past	accomplishments	or	inheritance	
rather	than	his	current	abilities,	the	powerful	have	a	reason	to	fear	markets.”20	As	
this	caveat	illustrates,	empirical	finance	can	deliberately,	unfairly	stray	far	from	a	
conceptual	ideal	as	a	result	of	misdirected	individual	and	corporate	incentives	
largely	governing	the	operations	of	financial	markets.	Given	that	finance,	and	the	
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proper	conduct	thereof,	holds	a	prominent	position	in	both	individual	and	corporate	
social	welfare,	the	empirical	facets	of	the	industry	must	also	be	explored	to	locate	
practical	areas	for	improvement	that	can	help	shift	the	financial	industry	in	line	with	
its	broader	conceptual	ambitions.	
2a.	Self‐Determination	
Insofar	as	finance	is	intended	to	serve	as	an	instrument	of	individual	self‐
determination,	there	are	some	severe	shortcomings	within	the	financial	industry	
that	preclude	individuals	from	being	able	to	pursue	their	dreams.	Higher	education	
is	one	activity	that	an	individual	might	pursue,	with	the	financial	assistance	of	a	
student	loan,	to	enhance	one’s	quality	of	life	and	future	prospects.	Empirically,	
unfortunately,	the	student	loan	financing	market	has	become	one	of	skewed	
incentives	for	bankers,	investors,	and	specialty	finance	lenders,	leaving	government	
and	taxpayers	to	shoulder	subsequent	costs.21	In	deeming	certain	individuals	or	
institutions	credit‐worthy	enough	to	merit	student	loan	financing,	private	financial	
institutions	have	recently	been	able	to	cherry	pick	those	whom	they	believe	to	be	
most	likely	to	pay	back	their	loans,	transferring	the	riskiest	pool	of	securities	into	
public	hands.	As	one	manifesto	entitled	Private	Student	Loan	Financing	in	an	Era	of	
Needs	and	Challenges	in	the	Institutional	Investor	Journal	advises	student	lenders:	
“the	quality	of	a	student	borrower’s	education	can	be	highly	correlated	to	the	
ability	of	that	borrower	to	obtain	gainful	employment	after	graduation	
ultimately	impacting	loan	performance.	For	this	very	reason,	schools	with	
high	federal	cohort	default	rates	and	those	with	historically	low	graduation	
rates	have	been	under	scrutiny…Investors	in	student	loan‐backed	ABS	must	
now	be	aware	of	the	profile	of	the	school	type	distribution	within	loan	
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pools…The	paradigm	has	truly	shifted	from	a	world	in	which	lenders	fought	
to	be	on	each	school’s	recommended	list	to	a	world	where	schools	are	
fighting	to	be	on	a	lender’s	approved	institution	list.”22	
	
Contrasting	Shiller’s	view	of	finance	as	the	mechanism	that	synchronizes	debtors’	
and	creditors’	goals	in	pursuit	of	an	overall	social	benefit,	this	depiction	of	the	
student	loan	market	reflects	the	relatively	subservient	position	of	borrowers	to	
financiers	with	commanding	control	of	capital.	Given	that	the	private	side	is	
unwilling	to	provide	funding,	even	for	education,	to	subprime	borrowers	in	volatile	
market	climates,	the	responsibility	is	thus	transferred	onto	government	to	pick	up	
the	financing	shortfall.	Unfortunately,	this	structural	issue	transfers	the	bulk	of	
default	risk	onto	government	and	taxpayers,	in	pursuit	of	increasing	educational	
accessibility,	while	allowing	private	lenders	to	collect	on	a	more	stable	stream	of	
loan	repayments.	This	empirical	deviation	from	a	fundamental	conceptual	aim	of	
finance	represents	an	incentive	problem	within	the	broader	financial	industry,	
through	which	private	financiers	can	privatize	profits	while	socializing	associated	
costs.	It	erodes	the	ability	of	finance	to	act	as	an	instrument	of	self‐determination	
and	must	be	addressed	when	synthesizing	an	idealist	view	of	finance	with	a	realist	
perspective.	
2b.	Efficient	Allocation	
A	strong	institutional	relationship	between	business	management	and	
financiers	should	theoretically	promote	broad‐based	economic	growth	and	social	
wealth	democratization.	Prevailing	data,	however,	indicates	that	finance	itself	
through	its	products	and	players	is	overly	susceptible	to	manipulation	by	the	most	
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powerful	private	corporations	at	the	expense	of	emergent	market	competitors.	As	
Gar	Alperovitz	admits	of	our	current	financial	institutions	in	his	book	America	
Beyond	Capitalism:		
“the	truth	is,	various	forms	of	manipulating	the	market	are	central	to	the	
operation	of	the	current	corporate‐dominated	political‐economic	system,	not	
peripheral	to	it.	They	come	with	the	territory	–	as	everyone	knows	full	well	
when	they	shift	their	gaze	away	from	abstract	theory	to	the	real	world	of	oil	
company	lobbying,	drug	company	political	payoffs,	Microsoft	anticompetitive	
maneuvering,	and	Enron	corruption…Leaving	aside	the	morality	of	the	
implicit	choices	of	the	present	system,	countless	studies	demonstrate	that	we	
currently	throw	away	literally	millions	of	productive	people	whose	
contribution	to	the	economy	could	be	enormous.”23	
	
In	noting	that	market	manipulation	has	become	central,	rather	than	peripheral,	to	
the	modern	functioning	of	US	financial	markets,	Alperovitz	concedes	that	our	
financial	system	is	skewed	in	favor	of	vested	corporate	interests.	Under	such	
conditions,	financial	capital	simply	cannot	be	matched	appropriately	to	more	
worthy	corporations	or	business	ventures.	Rather,	it	is	supplied	discriminately	to	
industry	giants	such	as	Microsoft	with	the	power	to	adjust	the	competitive	
landscape	to	suit	their	own	terms.	While	alternative	sources	of	financing,	such	as	
crowdfunding	and	microfinance,	have	sought	to	bridge	this	critical	capital	gap	for	
smaller	scale	“disruptive”	competitors,	economies	of	scale	cannot	effectively	be	built	
on	these	platforms	alone.24	This	shortcoming	of	empirical	corporate	finance,	as	
Alperovitz	additionally	notes,	comes	at	the	expense	of	both	opportunity	and	wealth	
democratization,	representing	a	deviation	from	the	fundamental	conceptual	
ambitions	of	finance.	Such	a	deficiency,	parallel	to	that	of	the	personal	finance	
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industry,	must	also	be	addressed	when	attempting	to	reform	the	infrastructure	of	
finance	more	broadly	to	service	its	theoretical	goal	of	allocative	efficiency.	
2c.	Fairness	
	 Financial	intermediaries	have	continually	failed	to	channel	resources	and	
opportunities	fairly	across	social	classes.	This	failure	has	resulted	in	compounding	
wealth	inequalities	over	time,	restricting	economic	development	and	locking	
potential	sources	of	capital	growth.	Fairness,	wherein	an	individual’s	or	
corporation’s	claim	to	financial	resources	or	capital	may	be	satisfied	in	proportion	
to	its	standalone	strength,	notwithstanding	preexisting	accumulated	advantages,	
may	be	gauged	through	a	variety	of	financial	metrics.	One	such	measure	of	a	
society’s	financial	fairness	is	the	extent	of	that	society’s	“financial	inclusion.”	
Financial	inclusion	gauges	the	accessibility	of	a	society’s	formal	and	informal	
financial	resources	and	measures	the	degree	to	which	that	society	compels	
individuals	or	firms	to	take	advantage	of	financial	resources.	Given	that	a	
precondition	of	fairness	may	be	the	extent	to	which	a	society	grants	individuals	
equal	access	to	financial	markets	and	their	associated	benefits,	broader	financial	
inclusion	would	correspond	with	a	more	“fair”	financial	market	environment.	As	
Rajan	and	Zingales	note,	financial	institutions’	exclusivity	bias	in	lending	to	those	
with	proven	collateral	assets,	though	perhaps	financially	rational,	is	also	unfair:	“the	
financier	will	naturally	gravitate	toward	financing	the	haves	simply	because	they	
have	the	collateral	or	connections	to	assuage	his	concerns…should	we	be	concerned	
[about	the	bias]?	We	believe	yes,	both	because	the	economy	cannot	produce	as	
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much	as	its	potential	and	because	what	it	does	produce	is	not	distributed	fairly.”25	
Biases	in	financial	inclusion	within	societies,	whether	a	result	of	underdeveloped	
financial	institutions	or	risk	mitigation	tactics,	beyond	being	unfair,	are	therefore	
economically	suboptimal.	They	keep	potential	sources	of	great	wealth	trapped	and	
prompt	a	vicious	cycle	of	wealth	inequality	that	must	be	closed	if	finance	is	to	be	
considered	truly	“fair.”	
In	their	analysis	of	financial	inclusion	within	and	among	various	world	
economies,	Asli	Demeriguc‐Kunt	and	Leora	Klapper	of	the	World	Bank’s	Finance	
and	Private	Sector	Development	Team’s	findings	reiterate	the	point	that	financial	
exclusion	leads	to	unfair	wealth	distribution.	Specifically,	they	find	that	those	at	the	
“base	of	the	pyramid”	are	much	less	able	to	take	advantage	of	financial	services	due	
to	cost	barriers,	access	issues,	or	sheer	unawareness	of	the	resources	that	are	
available	to	them.26	This	inability	to	utilize	financial	services	subsequently	
constrains	this	subset	of	the	population’s	growth	potential,	resulting	in	increasing	
cross‐social	wealth	stratification	beyond	simple	compounding	of	income	inequality.	
They	find	that	adults	who	hold	formal	accounts	at	financial	institutions	are	more	
likely	to	set	personal	savings	goals,	receive	steady	wage	payments	through	these	
accounts,	and	build	strong	credit	for	future	borrowing	purposes.	The	individuals	
who	do	not	open	accounts,	in	both	high‐income	and	developing	economies,	tend	to	
be	those	who	do	not	have	enough	money	to	commit	to	their	accounts	(30%),	who	
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cannot	afford	to	open	the	account	(25%),	or	who	do	not	have	easy	access	to	
commercial	institutions	providing	financial	services	(20%).27	The	constraints	placed	
on	these	individuals,	most	commonly	a	result	of	their	inherited	social	position,	
prevent	them	from	enjoying	the	same	benefits	of	financial	resources	as	those	who	
constitute	the	higher	end	of	the	socioeconomic	spectrum.	They	are	thus	less	able	to	
grow	their	personal	wealth	and	must	remain	seeded	at	the	base	of	the	pyramid	
while	the	wealthy	are	able	to	further	prosper.	From	this	angle,	it	becomes	clear	that	
society	has	a	responsibility	to	make	financial	resources	available	more	broadly	if	
each	individual	is	to	be	truly	rewarded	in	proportion	to	the	strength	of	their	claim.	
Through	making	financial	resources	more	accessible,	we	can	ensure	that	“instead	of	
an	aristocracy	of	the	merely	rich,	we	[will	be]	moving	to	an	aristocracy	of	the	
capable	and	the	rich…[We	will	be]	putting	the	human	being	at	the	center	of	
economic	activity	because,	when	capital	is	freely	available,	it	is	skills,	ideas,	hard	
work,	and	inescapably,	luck	that	create	wealth.”28	Under	these	conditions	we	can	
hope	to	have	a	system	of	finance	that	is	truly	“fair”	to	all	those	who	utilize	financial	
services.	
2d.	Long‐Termism	
The	focus	on	short‐term	profit	maximization	over	long‐term	value	creation	
has	perhaps	most	harmfully	derailed	modern	finance.	Myopic	compensation	
schemes,	direct	accountability	to	shareholders,	and	insufficient	risk	oversight,	
among	other	factors,	have	allowed	finance	to	develop	into	a	“race	to	the	bottom”	for	
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profits	rather	than	a	constructive	social	enterprise.29	As	Joseph	Heath	explains	in	his	
chapter	Agency	Theory	and	Self‐Interest,	the	individual	compulsion	to	act	in	
response	to	salient	self‐interests	often	overrides	longer‐term	considerations	of	firm	
wellbeing	or	value	creation.	He	characterizes	such	short‐termism	as	“opportunistic	
behavior,”	which	“…is	a	direct	consequence	of	agents	acting	in	accordance	with	the	
general	game‐theoretic	principle	known	as	sequential	rationality.	This	is	simply	the	
view	that,	in	a	multistage	game,	a	rational	strategy	must	not	only	be	utility‐
maximizing	at	the	point	at	which	it	is	chosen,	but	each	of	its	component	actions	
must	also	be	utility‐maximizing	at	the	point	at	which	it	is	to	be	performed.”	Heath	
concludes	from	this	theory	that	individuals	will	consequently	“act	unreservedly	
using	guile	and	deceit	–	not	only	when	necessary,	but	whenever	it	is	advantageous	
for	them	to	do	so.”30		Accordingly,	CEOs	will	have	incentive	to	“cook	the	books”	to	
inflate	their	annual	pay	packages,	supervisors	will	have	incentive	to	overlook	risky	
bets	made	by	their	employees	if	they	seem	to	provide	short‐term	upside,	and	
individuals	who	constitute	the	heart	of	financial	institutions	will	continue	to	act	
opportunistically	at	the	cost	of	long‐term	value	creation.	Short‐term	opportunistic	
behavior,	many	would	argue,	has	actually	catalyzed	recent	events	such	as	the	sub‐
prime	mortgage	crisis,	the	collapse	of	Enron,	and	the	trading	scandal	sparked	by	the	
“London	whale,”	leading	to	large‐scale	value	destruction	at	a	significant	cost	to	those	
in	society	whose	welfare	depends	on	healthy	financial	markets.	This	behavior,	in	the	
long‐term,	simply	cannot	comply	with	a	sustainable	business	or	social	model.	
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That	financial	capital	is	often	steered	into	short‐term	profit‐maximizing	
ventures	can	be	attributed	to	the	reward	structures	intrinsic	to	modern	financial	
markets.	Financial	analysis,	for	example,	values	firms	based	on	metrics	like	free	cash	
flow,	value	of	physical	assets,	or	dividend	payments	on	outstanding	equity.	This	
implies	that	firms	with	impressive	financial	statements	today	will	attract	
investment	while	firms	committing	their	resources	to	intangibles,	though	perhaps	
equally	valuable,	may	be	overlooked.31	In	the	short‐term,	it	is	these	firms	with	
strong	tangible	financials	that	will	seem	to	promise	the	greatest	return	on	
investment.	In	his	paper	The	Link	Between	Job	Satisfaction	and	Firm	Value	with	
Implications	for	Corporate	Social	Responsibility,	Alex	Edmans	argues	that	firm	
investments	in	intangibles,	though	value‐creating	over	time,	are	simply	not	
incorporated	accurately	into	current	stock	prices.	He	explains,	“…intangibles	are	not	
incorporated	because	the	market	lacks	information	on	their	value.	Since	they	cannot	
be	measured,	it	is	hard	for	managers	to	credibly	certify	their	value	to	outsiders.”	His	
results	thus	“support	managerial	myopia	theories	in	which	managers	underinvest	in	
intangibles	because	the	market	values	them	only	in	the	very	long	run.	This	
conclusion	in	turn	has	implications	for	how	to	design	organizations	to	encourage	
long‐term	growth.	We	currently	evaluate	managers	according	to	quarterly	earnings	
announcements.	But	to	induce	intangible	investment,	we	must	pay	them	based	on	
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the	stock	price	far	into	the	future.”32	According	to	Edmans’	findings,	those	firms	who	
invest	in	intangibles	are	ultimately	more	successful,	more	valuable,	in	the	long	run.	
However,	we	are	discouraging	this	type	of	far‐sighted	investment	behavior	with	our	
current	valuation	methodologies.	In	order	to	give	firms	the	ability	to	act	as	
visionaries,	then,	we	must	overcome	this	shortsightedness	and	begin	to	quantify	
long‐term	value	creation	financially	through	reformed	practices	and	incentive	
schemes.	
2e.	Summary	
Individual	and	corporate	finance,	propped	up	by	the	actions	of	underlying	
financial	institutions,	has	empirically	deviated	from	its	theoretical	purpose.	Though	
the	scale	of	this	deviation	today	is	difficult	to	gauge,	it	is	nonetheless	imperative	to	
begin	making	incremental	improvements	in	the	infrastructure	of	modern	finance	to	
move	reality	in	line	with	theory.	This	shift	in	philosophy	and	practice	will	only	come	
with	a	behavioral	adjustment	of	those	individuals	and	firms	operating	within	the	
financial	industry	itself.	As	Shiller	points	out,	“the	essential	challenge	for	leaders	to	
contemplate	in	coming	to	terms	with	the	future	of	finance	is	to	understand	that	it	
can	be	used	to	help	broaden	prosperity	across	an	increasingly	wide	range	of	social	
classes,	and	that	its	products	can	be	made	easier	for	people	to	use	and	can	be	better	
integrated	into	the	economy	as	a	whole.”33	If	the	future	of	finance	is	in	fact	to	be	a	
bright	one,	then	financial	institutions	must	begin	acting	responsibly,	understanding	
their	obligation	to	spread	prosperity	to	the	many	rather	than	restricting	it	to	the	
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few,	and	promoting	practices	and	tools	that	contribute	to	robust	economic	growth	
rather	than	short‐term	profit.	
Leaders	in	the	financial	space,	whether	they	are	CEOs	of	corporations	or	
heads	of	financial	institutions,	must	reorient	the	instruments	of	finance	in	pursuit	of	
the	democratization	of	wealth	going	forward.	The	student	loan	market	must	be	a	
means	of	accessing,	not	barring	education.	Corporate	entities	must	utilize	financial	
markets	to	increase	their	individual	competitiveness	rather	than	bar	potential	
market	entrants.	Financial	institutions	must	recognize	their	instrumentality	in	
keeping	the	capitalist	free	market	system	healthy.34	Only	under	these	admittedly	
more	theoretical	circumstances	can	finance	truly	serve	its	fundamental	purpose	and	
generate	prosperity	on	a	broad	social	scale.	
III.	Correcting	Finance	
	
	 Finance	can	be	incrementally	improved	in	order	to	reconcile	empirical	
observation	with	the	theoretical	aims	of	finance:	self‐determination,	efficient	
allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐term	wealth	growth.	To	this	end,	future	innovation	in	
finance	must	have	an	embedded	sense	of	social	responsibility	towards	the	
individuals	and	corporations	for	whom	finance	is	allegedly	working.	Actors	within	
the	financial	space	must	take	into	greater	account	the	social	externalities	of	their	
actions	rather	than	simply	analyzing	fiscal	implications.	Lastly,	the	orientation	of	
financial	institutions	must	be	altered	to	better	align	the	cooperative	aims	of	these	
institutions	and	the	actors	outside	of	the	financial	space	that	the	institutions	are	
intended	to	serve.	As	Asli	Demeriguc‐Kunt	and	Leora	Klapper	reinforce:	
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“Well‐functioning	financial	systems	serve	a	vital	purpose,	offering	savings,	
credit,	payment,	and	risk	management	products	to	people	with	a	wide	range	
of	needs.	Inclusive	financial	systems	–	allowing	broad	access	to	financial	
services,	without	price	or	nonprice	barriers	to	their	use	–	are	especially	likely	
to	benefit	poor	people	and	other	disadvantaged	groups.	Without	inclusive	
financial	systems,	poor	people	must	rely	on	their	own	limited	savings	to	
invest	in	their	education	or	become	entrepreneurs	–	and	small	enterprises	
must	rely	on	their	limited	earnings	to	pursue	promising	growth	
opportunities.	This	can	contribute	to	persistent	income	inequality	and	slower	
economic	growth.”35	
	
This	insight	makes	clear	that	the	principles	of	self‐determination,	efficient	
allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐term	wealth	generation	can	actually	be	pursued	under	
a	system	of	well‐functioning	markets.	Moreover,	such	well	functioning	markets,	
when	in	place,	can	serve	to	close	the	social	inequality	gaps	that	have	been	created	
and	exacerbated	as	a	product	of	mismanaged	markets.	If	financial	markets	are	
compelled,	in	practice,	to	pursue	the	principles	for	which	they	were	initially	
formulated,	the	result	will	be	greater	social	equity	of	wealth	and	social	opportunity	
going	forward.	Synthesizing	the	conceptual	and	the	empirical	in	finance	will	become	
critical	to	ensuring	the	trustworthiness	of	the	financial	industry	in	the	future	and	
therefore	is	the	key	to	its	sustainability.	
3a.	Financial	Engineering	in	Pursuit	of	Self‐Determination	
Personal	financial	products	must	be	designed	that	give	individuals	the	tools	
they	need	to	turn	their	present	investments	into	future	successes	while	also	
allowing	them	to	live	a	life	that	they	deem	meaningful.	Through	an	investment	in	
their	own	education	or	in	a	private	home,	individuals	can	increase	their	own	wealth	
and	explore	their	idiosyncratic	passions	with	the	help	of	finance.	Doing	so,	ideally,	
will	give	these	individuals	the	capacity	to	repay	their	loans,	an	outcome	that	is	also	
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in	the	best	interest	of	financial	institutions.	This	system	of	reciprocity,	based	on	
honest	contracting	and	trust	between	individuals	and	financiers,	can	be	established	
through	properly	designed,	humanized	financial	products.		
One	creative	form	of	financial	innovation	that	can	help	establish	a	symbiotic	
relationship	between	individuals	and	finance	is	insurance.	Home	insurance,	life	and	
health	insurance,	education	insurance,	and	even	more	idiosyncratic	forms	such	as	
crop	insurance,	can	give	individuals	the	peace	of	mind	that	they	need	to	pursue	their	
dreams	while	providing	them	with	financial	security	in	the	event	that	their	pursuits	
do	not	succeed.	Properly	devised	systems	of	insurance,	in	other	words,	can	allow	
finance	to	act	as	an	instrument	of	self‐determination	through	its	liberating	effect	on	
the	individual.	In	constructing	future	insurance	contracts,	as	Shiller	elaborates,	“if	
the	insurance	industry	is	to	become	more	humanized,	it	has	to	deal	better	with	the	
real	risks	that	trouble	people…”	Shiller	goes	on	to	explain	that	current	disability	
insurance,	while	hedging	some	of	the	risk	associated	with	individual	disabilities,	
does	not	fully	cover	all	the	risks	to	their	livelihoods.	He	claims,	“in	the	future,	
insurance	can	and	will	do	much	more.”	Accordingly,	Shiller	suggests	that	we	adopt	
an	innovative	new	approach	to	disability	insurance	called	livelihood	insurance.	He	
explains:	
“This	would	be	a	long‐term	insurance	policy	that	an	individual	could	
purchase	on	a	career,	an	education,	or	a	particular	investment	in	human	
capital.	One	could	choose	to	specialize	far	more	narrowly	than	is	commonly	
done	today	–	say,	on	a	particularly	interesting	career	direction	–	developing	
the	expertise	for	such	a	career	without	fear	of	the	consequences	if	the	
initiative	turned	out	badly.	The	insurance	policy	would	pay	off	with	a	
supplement	to	one’s	lifetime	income	if	it	turned	out	years	or	decades	later,	
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based	on	verifiable	data,	that	there	was	less	of	a	market,	or	even	no	market	at	
all,	for	people	with	this	career.”36	
	
Livelihood	insurance	represents	a	product	of	financial	engineering	that	puts	the	
human	at	the	center	of	its	design.	It	encourages	individuals	to	be	self‐determinant,	it	
indulges	in	idiosyncratic	passion,	and	it	provides	necessary	financial	security	if	the	
individual’s	pursuit	is	not	successful.	Future	products,	similarly,	should	seek	to	act	
as	instruments	of	self‐determination	to	bring	empirical	finance	in	line	with	
conceptual	ideals.	
3b.	Enlightened	Value	Maximization	as	a	Solution	to	Allocative	Inefficiency	
Finance	can	enhance	its	allocative	efficiency	by	identifying	and	funding	
business	opportunities	that	generate	maximal	long‐run	social	value,	rather	than	
continually	catering	to	the	entrenched	interests	of	corporations	that	dominate	
capital	markets.	One	way	of	doing	so,	proposed	by	Michael	Jensen	of	the	Harvard	
Business	School,	is	to	use	“enlightened	value	maximization”	as	a	tool	of	fundamental	
analysis.	Rather	than	determining	the	intrinsic	value	of	a	company	through	strictly	
financial	multiples	such	as	price‐to‐earnings	or	price‐to	book	ratios,	Jensen’s	
enlightened	value	maximization	ascribes	added	value	to	firms	whose	operations	and	
management	are	optimizing	long‐term	market	value.	His	valuation	methodology,	
while	not	fully	ignorant	of	short‐run	profit	indicators,	“adds	the	simple	specification	
that	the	objective	function	–	the	overriding	goal	–	of	the	firm	is	to	maximize	total	
long‐term	firm	market	value.	In	short,	the	change	in	the	total	long‐term	market	
value	of	the	firm	is	the	scorecard	by	which	success	is	measured.”	This	approach	
addresses	short‐term	allocative	inefficiency	because	it	“recognizes	the	possibility	
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that	financial	markets,	although	forward	looking,	may	not	understand	the	full	
implications	of	a	company’s	policies	until	they	begin	to	show	up	in	cash	flows	over	
time…”37	By	helping	to	identify	investments	that	will	be	sustainably	successful,	this	
form	of	valuation	gives	financial	companies	the	ability	to	operate	in	a	more	forward	
looking	manner.	It	can	help	them	overcome	a	short‐term	bias	towards	simply	
investing	in	companies	with	which	they	are	familiar	in	favor	of	investing	in	
companies	with	more	long‐term	growth	and	future	value	potential.	Financial	
institutions	electing	to	use	enlightened	value	maximization	as	their	preferred	
method	of	fundamental	analysis	can	have	the	effect	of	compelling	managers	and	
directors	to	act	in	what	they	believe	to	be	the	best	long‐run	interest	of	the	firm.	
While	not	a	complete	solution	to	the	problem	of	short‐termism,	it	analyzes	
performance	based	on	overall	value‐added	and	long‐term	wealth	creation,	not	
simply	instantaneous	profit	metrics.	This	strategy	of	fundamental	analysis	can	thus	
help	refocus	managers	and	directors	of	firms	and	can	help	financial	institutions	
allocate	capital	into	the	proper	channels	to	broaden	the	scope	of	economic	growth.	
3c.	Reinstating	Fair	Distribution	of	Wealth	
	 Finance	must	stop	contributing	to	the	unfair	allocation	of	monetary	and	
capital	resources.	Disproportionate	wealth	accumulation	at	the	top	of	the	economic	
pyramid	can	be	addressed	through	a	variety	of	strategies,	including	government	
regulation	of	financial	institutions	and	asset‐based	redistribution	schemes.	One	area	
in	which	government	can	realistically	intervene	is	in	regulating	the	generational	
transfer	of	resources	to	members	of	the	same	socioeconomic	class.		Inheritance	caps	
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can	limit	the	amount	of	wealth	that	is	transferred	from	generation	to	generation,	
helping	to	narrow	opportunity	gaps	that	entrench	social	positions.	Rajan	and	
Zingales	acknowledge,	“inefficient	and	concentrated	control	of	wealth	does	impose	
all	kinds	of	costs	on	society.	That	is	why	an	inheritance	tax,	structured	so	that	the	
rich	are	encouraged	to	transfer	passive	ownership	of	productive	assets,	rather	than	
active	control,	to	their	children	would	make	sense…[The	tax’s]	aim	should	be	to	
achieve	the	efficient	distribution	of	control.”38	This	regulation,	far	from	removing	
individual	incentive	to	work	for	profits	in	one’s	own	lifetime,	has	the	implicit	effect	
of	equalizing	economic	market	access	for	all	individuals	over	time.	Equal	market	
access,	in	turn,	can	help	finance	achieve	the	purpose	of	satisfying	claims	in	
proportion	to	their	standalone	strength	rather	than	satisfying	them	as	a	function	of	
an	unfairly	inherited	legacy	of	wealth.	In	this	same	vein,	the	government	can	also	
mandate	that	financial	institutions	make	their	resources,	such	as	commercial	
banking	services,	financial	advisors,	and	credible	lending	institutions,	available	at	
proportionally	compatable	prices	to	underserved	communities	so	that	the	poor	can	
take	advantage	of	these	resources	to	the	same	extent	that	the	rich	are	able	to.	
Breaking	down	the	barriers	to	market	access	for	all	members	of	society	will	usher	
finance	in	the	direction	of	fairness,	allowing	competitive	ideas	to	stand	on	their	own	
merits	without	regard	to	prior	socioeconomic	positioning.	
Even	more	far‐reaching	strategies,	such	as	the	one	proposed	by	Louis	Kelso,	a	
former	corporate	lawyer	and	investment	banker,	can	be	implemented	that	help	
implicitly	redirect	capital	in	a	more	“fair”	manner	through	financial	markets.	Kelso,	
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drawing	on	the	earlier	influences	of	Nobel	Prize	winning	economist	James	Meade	
and	Yale	economist	John	Roemer,	“realized	from	his	professional	experience	that	
one	of	the	main	–	and	strikingly	obvious	–	reasons	his	rich	clients	were	able	to	
multiply	their	ownership	of	stocks	and	bonds	was	that	their	existing	wealth	
provided	them	with	collateral	that	allowed	them	to	borrow	money	for	further	
investment…If	the	poor	had	access	to	collateral	and	experts,	Kelso	reasoned,	why	
could	they	not	also	make	money	by	investing	borrowed	funds?”39	Accordingly,	Kelso	
proposed	the	creation	of	a	“Capital	Diffusion	Insurance	Corporation,”	which	would	
allow	the	government	to	insure	individually	purchased	portfolios	of	diversified	
products.	These	portfolios	would	be	sold	principally	to	those	without	significant	
previous	exposure	or	access	to	such	financial	products.	The	government	in	this	
scheme	would	hedge	its	investment	risk	by	mandating	that	portfolios	remain	in	
escrow	until	paid	off	by	dividends,	at	which	point	the	portfolios	would	fall	under	full	
ownership	of	the	individual,	giving	them	a	second	source	of	income.	This	scheme	
would	“ultimately	result	in	a	major	system‐changing	buildup	of	wealth	among	the	
citizenry”	with	an	added	perk	being	that	it	“does	not	propose	taxing	away	or	
expropriating	existing	wealth.	Instead,	a	steady	shift	in	ownership	would	be	slowly	
accomplished	as	new	wealth	is	created	in	the	normal	processes	of	economic	
development	over	long	stretches	of	time.”	This	type	of	structural	reform,	extending	
credit	fairly	and	thoughtfully	to	those	in	underserved	communities,	will	increase	
financial	literacy	and	sophistication	in	these	areas.	Over	time,	capital	ownership	will	
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be	implicitly	democratized,	opportunity	gaps	will	be	narrowed,	and	finance	will	
structurally	be	directed	towards	serving	its	purpose	of	fair	wealth	distribution.		
3d.	Long–Termism	and	the	Socially	Responsible	Investing	(SRI)	Movement	 	
Progress	has	been	made	in	the	field	of	financial	innovation	to	develop	
instruments	that	intrinsically	embed	some	form	of	long‐term	social	purpose	or	
responsibility.	“Impact	investing,”	whereby	capital	is	contributed	to	socially	
responsible	investment	vehicles	with	environmental,	social,	or	governance	(ESG)	
criteria	embedded	into	their	core	philosophies,	has	expanded	in	the	U.S.	from	a	$639	
billion	industry	in	1995	to	a	$3.74	trillion	industry	in	2012,	with	11%	of	all	
professionally	managed	assets	falling	into	a	“socially	responsible	investments”	
portfolio.40	The	expansion	of	this	asset	class,	a	result	of	SRI’s	comparable	return	
profile	to	traditionally	diversified	portfolios,	represents	a	growing	demand	for	
financial	products	to	reflect	more	conscientious,	growth‐oriented	investment	
strategies.41	The	deepening	of	the	SRI	field	in	recent	years,	as	a	Rockefeller	Institute	
Report	entitled	Achievements,	Challenges,	and	What’s	Next	in	Building	the	Impact	
Investing	Industry	explains,	comes	as	a	result	of	“growing	recognition	that	existing	
resources	are	insufficient	to	address	severe	poverty,	inequality,	environmental	
destruction,	and	other	complex,	global	issues,	especially	among	Western	nations	
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that	are	already	reducing	their	aid	budgets	and	domestic	social	spending.”42	
Accordingly,	large	pools	of	capital	overseen	by	financial	institutions	are	beginning	to	
adopt	a	stronger	social	position,	intending	to	compensate	for	the	immediate	
shortfall	they	recognize	as	having	been	created	within	and	among	modern	state	
institutions.	These	funds’	social	position	must	necessarily	be	supported	by	a	long‐
term,	value	creation	objective	rather	than	short‐term	profit	maximization.	The	
recent	growth	of	the	SRI	field	implies	that	such	value	creation	can	in	fact	become	the	
mainstream	as	the	SRI	market	matures,	allowing	finance	to	more	organically	serve	
its	goal	of	long‐termism.	
The	Canadian	Pension	Plan	Investment	Board	(CPPIB),	with	$170.1	billion	in	
pension	funds	under	its	management,	is	an	example	of	a	financial	institution	that	
has	taken	a	long‐term,	socially	considerate	approach	to	its	own	investment	
activities,	believing	that	it	can	produce	stronger	long‐term	fund	performance	with	a	
conscious	investment	philosophy.	As	CPPIB’s	“Policy	on	Responsible	Investing”	
platform	affirms,	“responsible	corporate	behaviour	with	respect	to	environmental,	
social,	and	governance	factors	can	generally	have	a	positive	influence	on	long‐term	
financial	performance.”43	In	accordance	with	this	investment	philosophy,	CPPIB	
uses	its	financial	power	to	help	develop	spaces	like	the	green	tech	industry,	or	to	
support	companies	with	more	intangible	value	in	the	form	of	progressive	
management	or	board	structures.	In	this	scenario,	tools	of	finance	are	being	used	to	
bolster	the	infrastructure	of	the	“good	society,”	creating	positive	mutual	payoffs	for	
both	investors	and	for	society	more	broadly.	The	CPPIB’s	philosophy	has,	to	date,	
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been	enormously	successful	in	growing	the	size	of	the	national	pension	fund	and,	all	
the	while,	has	been	instrumental	in	driving	forward	numerous	development	and	
sustainability	initiatives	across	the	world.	Financial	innovations	should,	accordingly,	
embed	concepts	of	social	responsibility	and	adopt	an	investment	angle	that	ascribes	
greater	value	to	intangibles	if	they	seek	to	be	profitable	over	a	long‐term	time	
horizon.	
	 To	continue	advancing	a	culture	of	moral	obligation	in	finance,	it	must	be	
acknowledged	that	profitability	within	markets	and	social	progress	are	not	mutually	
exclusive.	Financial	institutions	cannot	be	profitable	if	they	refuse	to	propagate	a	
vibrant	economic	system.	Neglecting	this	social	responsibility	in	turn	harms	those	
who	depend	on	stable,	dependable	economic	growth	to	realize	their	goals	in	life	and	
in	business.	Rajan	and	Zingales	reiterate	regarding	this	symbiotic	relationship:		
“No	one	will	have	the	incentive	to	undertake	long‐term	investment	–	whether	
in	acquiring	specialized	skills	or	in	building	physical	capital	–	when	there	is	
no	clarity	about	what	the	rules	of	the	game	are.	Thus,	the	societal	pie	shrinks,	
and	more	and	more	of	what	remains	goes	to	the	ruling	clique	because	they	
have	the	arbitrary	power	to	determine	shares…The	right	answer	is	not	to	
concentrate	economic	power	even	more	but	to	disperse	it	more	widely.	And	
one	way	to	do	this	is	to	expand	access	to	finance.”44	
	
Thus	if	finance	seeks	to	be	sustainable	and	trustworthy	in	the	future,	as	it	should	
given	the	countless	benefits	that	healthy	markets	can	provide,	it	must	jointly	
incentivize	cooperative	action	on	the	part	of	both	entities	in	a	financial	transaction.	
Institutions	must	be	assured	that	they	can	collect	on	loans	or	investments	that	they	
make,	which	they	can	gain	greater	assurance	of	through	lending	and	investing	
responsibly.	Long‐term	objectives	must	take	precedent	over	a	short‐term	financial	
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prisoners	dilemma	for	this	type	of	financial	infrastructure	to	take	root.	Should	this	
objective	be	achieved,	though,	the	social	and	financial	payoffs	to	all	actors	involved	
can	be	increased.	
IV.	The	Future	of	Wealth	Democratization	
	
1.	What	is	Wealth	Democratization	and	should	it	Constitute	a	Social	End?	
	
	 Wealth	democratization	is	the	process	through	which	inequality	is	
diminished	with	broadened	access	to	society’s	assets.	The	focus	of	wealth	
democratization	should	be	the	subset	of	society	with	restricted	access	to	these	
assets,	typically	those	on	the	lower	end	of	the	socioeconomic	spectrum.	Assets	can	
be	material	and	can	include	money,	shelter,	or	leisure	items;	or	they	can	be	of	a	
more	intangible	nature,	and	can	include	availability	of	high	quality	education,	access	
to	reliable	public	safety	outlets,	or	even	a	feeling	of	security	in	one’s	own	
community.	All	of	these	assets	are	critical	to	the	production	of	a	robustly	“wealthy”	
society	and,	thus,	we	should	seek	to	maximize	each	individual	within	society’s	
access	to	these	assets	if	we	want	to	construct	a	more	solid	social	foundation.	
Wealth	democratization,	because	of	its	multi‐dimensionality,	must	be	a	
proactive	process,	brought	about	by	the	restructuring	of	institutions	that	direct	and	
control	social	wealth.	Wealth	democratization	cannot	be	achieved	through	
retroactive	redistributive	measures	or	through	progressive	taxation	schemes.	
Rather,	it	must	be	driven	forward	by	broader	economic	growth,	a	byproduct	of	the	
proper	functioning	of	financial	markets.	In	this	regard,	the	orientation	of	financial	
institutions	is	most	critical.	Financial	institutions,	through	their	products	and	
practices,	have	a	unique	ability	to	spread	or	restrict	access	to	scarce	social	assets.	As	
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Rajan	and	Zingales	note,	“a	good	financial	system	broadens	access	to	funds.	By	
contrast,	in	an	underdeveloped	financial	system,	access	is	limited.	Because	funds	are	
so	important,	the	financier	who	controls	access	is	powerful,	but	because	access	is	so	
limited,	the	financier	can	make	money	doing	very	little.”45	Within	this	example,	the	
modern	US	financial	markets	have	come	to	resemble	an	underdeveloped,	or	
improperly	functioning,	financial	domain.	Financiers	with	control	of	funds,	who	
have	the	power	and	discretion	to	broaden	access	to	opportunities	such	as	education	
and	home	ownership,	have	neglected	to	use	this	position	of	power	to	service	the	
best	interests	of	society.	Rather,	by	raising	premiums	on	student	loans	or	selling	
toxic	securities	to	trusting	investors,	financiers	have	often	managed	to	garner	
wealth	for	themselves	and	their	firms	at	the	expense	of	a	greater	social	goal.	To	the	
extent	that	a	socioeconomic	obligation	begets	finance,	institutions	must	thus	be	
reoriented	in	pursuit	of	greater	wealth	democratization.	
The	pursuit	of	greater	democratization	of	wealth	through	expanded	access	to	
value‐creating	financial	tools	should	constitute	a	social	end.	By	spreading	wealth	
more	equitably,	the	tools	of	finance	have	the	power	to	raise	the	bottom	line	in	
society	and	contribute	to	a	regenerative	cycle	of	economic	productivity.	In	
formulating	the	concept	of	a	“pluralist	commonwealth”	in	America	Beyond	
Capitalism,	Gar	Alperovitz	seeks	to	imagine	a	society	in	which	economic	and	
financial	innovation	is	only	embraced	if	its	core	purpose	is	to	provide	for	those	with	
limited	access	to	capital	more	efficiently	or	effectively	than	existing	infrastructure	is	
able	to.	The	essence	of	the	pluralist	commonwealth	lies	in	“the	principle	that	
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ownership	of	the	nation’s	wealth	must	ultimately	be	shifted,	institutionally,	to	
benefit	the	vast	majority.”46	Redistributing	wealth	institutionally	rather	than	
retroactively,	Alperovitz	argues,	stimulates	the	economy	from	the	bottom	up.	It	
allows	those	previously	excluded	from	the	world	of	finance	to	enjoy	its	intrinsic	
benefits	and,	thus,	contribute	back	positively	to	the	overall	economy.	A	financially	
inclusive	infrastructure,	Rajan	and	Zingales	agree,	allows	society	to	unlock	
otherwise	latent	sources	of	economic	growth,	which	can	create	a	positive	feedback	
of	economic	and	even	social	stability.	Though	more	equitable	financial	inclusion	
does	not	imply,	on	one	dimension,	that	income	inequality	will	be	narrowed,	it	does	
create	the	possibility	that	those	at	the	base	of	the	socioeconomic	pyramid	can	
enhance	their	probability	of	achieving	financial	success.	Accordingly,	they	note	that	
in	theory,	“financial	revolution	is	thoroughly	liberal	in	spirit.	Instead	of	capital,	it	
puts	the	human	being	at	the	center	of	economic	activity	because,	when	capital	is	
freely	available,	it	is	skills,	ideas,	hard	work,	and	inescapably,	luck	that	create	
wealth.”47	Thus	wealth	democratization	can	underlie	a	social	revolution	to	replace	
the	unfairly	biased	socioeconomic	status	quo	with	a	more	economically	constructive	
ordering.	In	reorienting	finance	to	be	more	wholly	inclusive,	then,	we	can	also	hope	
to	achieve	greater	economic	stability	and	long‐term	growth.	
2.	Historical	Alternative	Means	of	Democratizing	Growth	
	
	 Historically	the	systematic	redistribution	of	capital	through	retroactive	tax	
measures	or	a	graduated	income	tax	has	served	as	the	primary	means	of	
democratizing	“wealth”	socially.	However,	such	measures	are	simply	insufficient	to	
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promote	greater	sustainable	social	equality	through	wealth	democratization.	
Progressive	taxation,	for	example,	does	not	provide	people	with	the	same	incentives	
to	contribute	back	to	the	economy	as	does	supplying	them	with	empowering	
financial	tools	because	it	is	an	“after‐the‐fact”	measure.	It	has	little	to	no	bearing	on	
actors’	prior	behavior.	Further,	the	opportunity	costs	of	such	redistributive	
measures	are	significant:	we	are	economically	disincentivizing	those	with	lower	
incomes	to	mobilize	their	powerful	human	capital	resources,	and	we	are	
incentivizing	those	with	higher	incomes	to	seek	short	term	individual	profits	that	
outpace	the	tax	schemes.	Still,	this	form	of	redistribution	has	been	pervasive	
because	of	its	political	defensibility	and	because	of	the	ease	with	which	it	can	be	
systematized.	It	is	clear	today,	however,	that	“redistributive	‘after‐the‐fact’	
measures	are	no	longer	viable,	and	something	much	more	fundamental	is	needed”	
to	adequately	address	growing	wealth	inequality	trends.48	
	 In	deriving	alternatives	to	‘after‐the‐fact’	taxation	measures,	new	methods	of	
redistribution	have	been	proposed	that	attempt,	but	have	not	yet	succeeded,	to	
systematically	democratize	wealth.	Measures	such	as	the	Earned	Income	Tax	Credit	
and	more	proactive	federal	tax	subsidies	for	asset	ownership	seek	to	generate	
economic	activity	among	those	on	the	lower	end	of	the	socioeconomic	spectrum.	It	
is	the	goal	of	such	measures	to	subsequently	allow	these	members	of	society	to	
contribute	to	a	more	robust	and	stable	economic	growth,	with	payoffs	for	this	
growth	being	realized	widely	and	more	sustainably	through	a	positive	feedback	
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mechanism.49	These	taxation	schemes	encourage	saving	rather	than	punishing	
consumption,	and	can	provide	broader	access	to	physical	assets	that	can,	allegedly,	
be	put	to	more	productive	use	when	in	the	hands	of	a	broader	subset	of	society.	
Nonetheless,	they	are	still	far	from	ideal	in	allocating	society’s	resources,	as	they	
must	presuppose	inequality.	As	Richard	Freeman,	a	Harvard	economist	and	author	
of	the	book	The	New	Inequality:	Creating	Solutions	for	Poor	America,	remarks	
idealistically,	“if	we	were	to	start	democratic	capitalism	with	a	blank	slate,	we	would	
naturally	divide	the	ownership	of	existing	physical	assets	equally	among	the	
population…	Our	main	strategy	–	be	we	left	or	right	–	for	fighting	income	inequality	
under	capitalism,	should	be	to	assure	a	fair	initial	distribution	of	physical	and	
human	capital	themselves…equality	of	income	obtained	in	the	first	instance	via	
greater	equality	in	those	assets,	rather	than	as	after‐the‐fact	(of	earning	or	luck)	
state	redistribution	of	income	from	rich	to	poor,	would	enable	us	to	better	square	
the	circle	of	market	efficiency	and	egalitarian	aspiration.”50	Though	this	depiction	of	
a	more	egalitarian	capitalist	society	is	indeed	a	romantic	one,	it	is	simply	
incomprehensible	that	we	could	revert	today	to	a	social	blank	slate	and	begin	
dividing	assets	equitably.	For	this	reason,	those	with	substantial	control	of	society’s	
assets,	namely	financiers	and	financial	institutions,	should	be	forced	to	adopt	a	
systematic	bias	in	favor	of	provisioning	assets	more	fairly.	If	financial	institutions	
can	accomplish	this	goal,	inequality	could	begin	to	recede	as	a	social	presupposition	
as	the	stratification	of	society	began	to	narrow.	The	tighter	association	of	social	
classes	has	several	positive	implications	for	future	economic	creativity,	growth,	and	
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sustainability,	and	thus	must	be	pursued	as	an	end	in	itself	principally	through	the	
reorientation	of	finance.	
3.	Finance	as	the	Preferable	Means	of	Democratization	
	 Given	that	measures	such	as	‘after‐the‐fact’	taxation	and	federal	subsidies	are	
insufficient	to	address	the	issue	of	wealth	disparities	in	the	U.S.,	the	role	of	finance	
in	abetting	this	problem	is	worth	examining.	Finance’s	implicit	instrumentality	in	
directing	social	capital	should	allow	the	proper	focus	of	its	faculties	to	play	a	
substantial	role	in	narrowing	ever‐expanding	wealth	gaps.51	One	non‐profit	
instrument	of	finance,	the	Community	Development	Financial	Institution	(CDFI),	
serves	to	illustrate	how	properly	oriented	financial	infrastructure	can	play	a	role	in	
preemptively	redistributing	capital	for	the	purpose	of	wealth	democratization.	
CDFIs,	which	can	come	in	the	form	of	credit	unions,	banks,	loan	funds,	and	venture	
capital	funds,	all	seek	to	utilize	the	tools	of	finance	to	broaden	initial	ownership	of	
assets	in	traditionally	underserved	communities.	In	doing	so,	these	financial	
institutions	take	a	long‐term	view	of	economic	development	while	simultaneously	
satisfying	a	responsibility	to	raise	the	socioeconomic	bottom	line.	As	Alperovitz	
remarks,	“the	more	than	thirty‐five	year	developmental	trend	that	has	produced	the	
modern	Community	Development	Corporation	is	intimately	related	to	the	U.S.	
political	economy’s	declining	capacity	to	address	problems	of	inequality	and	
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poverty	directly	through	redistribution	or	through	major	job‐creation	strategies.”52	
The	CDFI,	in	contrast	with	traditional	redistribution	methods,	is	preventative	rather	
than	responsive	in	its	approach.	It	provides	traditionally	underserved	communities	
with	greater	initial	access	to	assets	through	the	tools	of	finance,	where	asset	
ownership	can	be	leveraged	more	efficiently	and	financial	investment	can	be	more	
tangibly	converted	into	broad‐based	economic	growth.	In	tapping	these	
communities	locally,	provided	that	they	use	the	proper	tools	and	procedures,	
financial	institutions	can	thus	align	their	day‐to‐day	operations	with	a	more	
conceptual	ideal	of	finance.	In	this	way,	rather	than	through	outdated	tax	schemes	
that	simply	address	fiscal	disparities,	we	can	truly	begin	the	long	process	of	wealth	
democratization.	
Financial	tools	do	not	necessarily	have	to	operate	in	the	non‐profit	sphere	to	
have	the	effect	of	democratizing	wealth.	As	Waheed	Hussain	notes	in	his	critique	of	
Alperovitz’s	Pluralist	Commonwealth,	competitive	financial	institutions	have	no	
immediate	incentive	to	voluntarily	forgo	profits	for	the	sake	of	more	evenhanded	
wealth	distribution:		
“For	a	purely	voluntary	process	[of	wealth	democratization]	to	work…you	
would	have	to	appeal	to	the	public‐spiritedness	of	those	who	currently	own	
the	wealth	in	society	–	corporations,	private	equity	funds,	large	investors,	
and	so	on	–	to	donate	money	to	nonprofits,	community	development	
organizations,	employee	stock	plans,	and	all	of	the	rest.	Moreover,	you	would	
have	to	get	them	to	donate	in	amounts	that	would	not	only	support	the	
livelihood	of	small	groups	of	people,	but	would	add	up	to	a	fundamental	shift	
in	the	pattern	of	wealth	ownership	in	society.	A	voluntary	wealth	transfer	on	
this	scale	is	not	only	unlikely,	but	it	would	probably	be	historically	
unprecedented…”53	
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Given	that	competitive	profit	incentives	in	the	private	sphere	often	preclude	a	
natural	shift	in	the	direction	of	wealth	democratization,	innovative	solutions	should	
be	designed	that	can	simultaneously	satisfy	this	obligation	of	finance	while	
producing	competitive	returns.	In	this	space,	Baker	and	Fung	highlight	recent	
financial	developments	from	the	private	sector	that	have	sought,	proactively,	to	
reverse	an	inclination	towards	wealth	inequity.	Specifically,	they	note	the	recent	
ascendance	of	institutional	investors	to	a	position	of	greater	prominence	in	the	
responsible	investment	space.	These	for‐profit	investors,	which	include	“insurance	
funds,	public	and	private	pension	funds,	banks,	and	mutual	funds,”	are	beginning	to	
take	a	more	long‐term	approach	to	investing,	deemphasizing	immediate	profit	
maximization	and	investing	instead	in	more	broadly	constructive	ventures	such	as	
microfinance	and	infrastructure	development	that	will	deliver	proven,	stable	
returns	farther	down	the	road.54	
The	Omidyar‐Tufts	Microfinance	Fund	(OTMF)	is	an	example	of	a	for‐profit	
endowment	fund	investing	in	microfinance	that	seeks	a	9%	annual	return	on	
investment,	synthesizing	the	goals	of	profitability	and	wealth	democratization.	The	
objectives	of	this	“patient	capital”	fund,	to	develop	microfinance	into	a	stronger	
asset	class	and	to	open	opportunities	for	business	development	to	traditionally	
underserved	communities,	contribute	directly	to	the	process	of	wealth	
democratization.	However,	they	achieve	these	objectives	while	delivering	necessary	
funds	to	the	University	for	operations	and	financial	aid	purposes.	As	Tufts	
endowment	officer	Tryfan	Evans	even	noted,	“of	the	two	goals	[microfinance	
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support	and	a	high	return	on	investment],	the	commercial	objective	of	enhancing	
the	university’s	return	overrides.	This	flows	from	the	belief	that	the	goal	of	
enhancing	capital	flows	to	microfinance	in	a	meaningful	way	can	only	be	achieved	if	
we	first	succeed	in	demonstrating	that	a	commercial	investor	can	achieve	
commercial	objectives	such	as	supporting	the	operating	budget	of	an	educational	
institution	by	investing	in	the	sector.”55	As	Evans	reiterates	here,	wealth	
democratization	can	be	compatible	with	competitive	profitability	if	pursued	through	
appropriately	constructed	and	oriented	investment	vehicles.	If	wealth	
democratization	is	to	remain	a	fundamental	pursuit	of	the	private	financial	space,	as	
it	should	be,	further	innovations	such	as	the	OTMF	must	be	designed	and	
implemented	to	synchronize	the	goals	of	profitability	and	social	responsibility.	
	 Finance	certainly	has	the	capacity	to	ensure	that	wealth	is	distributed	
equitably	in	society.	A	more	wealthy	society	is	one	in	which	people	can	feel	
relatively	free	to	pursue	their	individual	goals	and	interests,	and	one	in	which	
corporations	of	different	sizes	and	in	different	stages	can	feel	empowered	to	
compete	in	a	fair	marketplace.	Certainly	wealth	can	only	be	generated	against	a	
backdrop	of	economic	growth,	so	financial	institutions	should	only	expect	to	profit	
fractionally	off	of	the	contribution	that	they	make	to	such	economic	growth	as	
measured	by	increases	in	national	GDP.	However,	should	the	infrastructure	be	put	
in	place	for	finance	to	spread	ownership	of	society’s	assets,	long‐term	sustainability	
can	realistically	be	ingrained	into	financial	transactions	with	the	ultimate	payoffs	
being	shared	collectively.	
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V.	Conclusion	
Finance	is	a	human	institution.	Like	all	human	designs,	it	is	imperfect	and	
improvable.	Finance	conceptually	should	give	individuals	a	vehicle	for	self‐
determination,	should	fairly	and	efficiently	allocate	capital	to	the	individual	and	the	
corporation,	and	should	take	a	long‐term	growth	perspective.	As	Robert	Shiller	
agrees,	“the	key	to	achieving	our	goals	and	enhancing	human	values	is	to	maintain	
and	continually	improve	a	democratic	financial	system	that	takes	account	of	the	
diversity	of	human	motives	and	drives.	We	need	a	system	that	allows	people	to	
make	complex	and	incentivizing	deals	to	further	their	goals...	It	must	be	a	system	
that	redirects	the	inevitable	human	conflicts	into	a	manageable	arena,	an	arena	that	
is	both	peaceful	and	constructive.”56	This	simple	depiction	of	finance	as	an	means	of	
translating	individual	creative	expression	into	broad‐based	economic	growth	
necessarily	engenders	a	complex	system	of	institutions	and	products	designed	to	
service	these	lofty	goals.	Committing	financial	institutions	and	practices	to	the	
achievement	of	more	democratic	prosperity,	however,	is	necessary	if	we	want	our	
financial	industry	to	be	a	truly	sustainable	one.	
Modern	finance	has	strayed	from	its	obligation	to	serve	the	goals	of	self‐
determination,	efficient	capital	allocation,	fairness,	and	long‐term	growth.	
Deviations	occur	at	both	the	individual	level	and	firm	level	and	are	largely	a	result	of	
flawed	institutional	design.	Individuals	in	society	who	inherit	a	legacy	of	wealth	are	
able	to	more	rapidly	multiply	their	resources	through	the	tools	of	finance,	through	
stocks	and	bonds	and	asset	appreciation,	enjoying	greater	opportunities	to	pursue	
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self‐determination	than	those	individuals	who	constitute	the	base	of	the	economic	
pyramid.	Financial	institutions	should	work	to	implicitly	remedy,	rather	than	
exacerbate,	this	wealth	discrimination	over	time.	Shiller	reiterates:	
The	democratization	of	finance…calls	for	an	improvement	in	the	nature	and	
extent	of	participation	in	the	financial	system,	including	awareness	of	
fundamental	information	about	the	workings	of	the	system.	The	public	needs	
to	have	reliable	information,	and	that	can	only	be	provided	by	advisers,	legal	
representatives,	and	educators	who	see	their	roles	as	one	of	promoting	
enlightened	stewardship.	When	people	can	benefit	from	such	help,	they	will	
come	to	feel	less	strongly	that	our	economy	is	run	by	a	power	elite.	At	
present	most	people	have	little	or	no	such	information.	Instead	they	are	
routinely	confronted	by	salespeople	for	financial	products,	who	have	
inadequate	incentive	to	tell	them	what	they	really	need	to	know.	But	it	could	
be	different	under	a	truly	enlightened	system	of	financial	capitalism.57	
	
Indeed,	under	a	truly	enlightened	system	of	financial	capitalism,	equitable	
distribution	of	financial	resources	can	contribute	to	widened	social	prosperity	and,	
ultimately,	longer‐range	economic	growth.	It	is	imperative	that	we	create	a	
financially	inclusive	society	in	order	for	all	individuals	to	take	advantage	of	finance	
as	an	instrument	of	self‐determination	and	for	all	emergent	business	enterprises	to	
have	an	equal	chance	to	secure	investment	capital.	Through	leveling	the	competitive	
playing	field,	we	can	make	finance	work	for	the	many	rather	than	the	few	and	
generate	social	wealth	in	the	process.	
	 The	wealth	generated	by	a	properly	functioning	financial	system	should	be	
democratically	distributed	to	ensure	sustainability	of	the	system.	Past	methods	of	
redistribution	have	failed	to	address	growing	wealth	gaps	because	they	have	
focused	on	income	disparity,	though	income	only	represents	a	single	component	of	
one’s	overall	wealth.	As	incomes	diverge,	so	too	do	opportunities	to	access	high‐
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quality	education,	to	purchase	appreciable	assets,	and	to	receive	the	credit	
necessary	to	advance	oneself	socioeconomically.	Wealth	must	be	democratically	
distributed	through	the	implicit	functioning	of	financial	institutions.	The	rising	
popularity	of	Community	Development	Financial	Institutions	(CDFIs)	as	an	
alternative	to	traditional	bank	lenders,	as	well	as	the	recent	ascendance	of	
institutional	investors,	have	proven	that	financially	inclusive	strategies	can	promote	
broader,	more	stable	prosperity.	Indeed,	in	the	wake	of	the	recent	financial	crisis,	
given	that	these	democratically	oriented	institutions	and	strategies	fared	well	
compared	to	traditional	financial	institutions,	these	models	may	provide	us	with	
insight	into	how	we	can	best	navigate	the	future	of	finance.	
	 The	institutions	of	finance	can	work	for	all.	Through	proper	institutional	
orientation,	we	can	maintain	a	vibrant,	competitive,	and	growing	market	economy	
while	still	raising	the	bottom	line.	In	concluding	his	book	Finance	and	the	Good	
Society,	Robert	Shiller	notes,	“many	of	our	hopes	for	the	future	should	be	pinned	on	
further	development	of	the	institutions	representing	financial	capitalism.	We	are	
easily	dazzled	today	by	advances	in	information	technology,	and	these	advances	can	
certainly	interact	positively	with	financial	innovations.	But	the	advances	in	our	
economic	institutions	may	ultimately	be	more	important	than	those	in	our	
hardware	and	software.	The	financial	system	is	itself	an	information‐processing	
system	–	one	built	out	of	human,	rather	than	electronic,	units	–	and	the	field	of	
artificial	intelligence	is	nowhere	close	to	replacing	human	intelligence.”58	Indeed,	no	
algorithm	or	technological	innovation	will	be	able	to	solve	such	a	fundamentally	
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human	problem	as	the	orientation	of	our	financial	institutions.	We	must	take	the	
reins	and	steer	our	finance	in	the	direction	of	value	creation	and	fair	allocation	if	we	
hope	to	envision	a	socioeconomic	future	that	is	both	prosperous	and	sustainable.	
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